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Background
I Violence is destructive, especially in developing countries.
I Abrupt law and order for economic activities.
I Destroy infrastructure.
I Run out resources that could have been used for production.
I Armed conflict is among the worst: contested incompatibility
with government involved and with the use of armed forces.
I An important concern for poverty eradication and economic
development.
Research Question
I Does foreign aid have an effect on armed conflict in the
recipient countries in Sub-Saharan Africa?
I The answer to this question has very important policy
implications.
Literature
I Most of the literature focuses on aid and conflict at country
level.
I Collier and Hoeffler (2002), Collier and Hoeffler (2007), De
Ree and Nillesen (2009), Nielsen et al. (2011).
I But, most aid projects are local activities.
I Other literature focuses on specific aid projects.
I Findley et al. (2011), Strandow et al. (2016).
I But, what is the average effect?
I Most of the above literature focuses on conflict onset
probability and conflict continuation probability.
I But, what about the severity?
This Project
I Local level: ADM2, the second administrative division,
equivalent to the U.S. county.
I Average effect.
I Conflict occurrences and fatalities.
I By time precision and conflict types.
I Non-linear effect.
Aid Projects
Conflict Events
Conflict Kernel Density: Weighted by Fatalities
Model Specification
conflicti ,t = β0+β1conflicti ,t−1+β2ln(1+aidi ,t−1)+X ′i ,t−1γ+δi+δt+εi ,t
I conflicti ,t : the number of conflict occurrences or fatalities in
region i and time t.
I aidi ,t−1: aid to region i and time t − 1.
I Xi ,t−1: logged night lights as proxy for economic activities in
region i at t − 1; logged population in region i at t − 1;
natural resource rents as percentage of GDP at country level
at t − 1; ICRG scores for religious tensions, ethnic tensions
and military in politics at country level at t − 1.
I Logged aid at t − 2 and t − 3 are used as instrumental
variables for aid at t − 1.
Data Sources: 1997-2012
Data Data Sources
Aid AidData (2015)
Conflict ACLED (2017)
Night lights NOAA (2015)
Population CIESIN and CIAT (2015)
Administrative boundary GAAD (2015)
Natural Resource Rents WDI (2017)
Religious tensions ICRG (2013)
Ethnic tensions ICRG (2013)
Military in Politics ICRG (2013)
Data Summary Statistics
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Conflict Occurrence 76940 1.521 10.6252 0 665
Fatalities 76940 8.3752 362.1699 0 64672
Aid ($) 76919 6.85E+07 2.95E+08 0 9.47E+09
Lights 72409 1485.909 4270.281 0 84233
Population 80073 192782.8 329871.4 0 7955719
Lights per capita 72409 0.0287 0.1677 0 11.1728
Natural Resource Rents 962 13.9099 14.0389 0.0011 89.1661
Religious tensions 576 4.1663 1.3152 0 6
Ethnic tensions 576 3.2307 1.1478 0 5
Military in politics 576 2.4627 1.6964 0 6
Main Regression Results
VARIABLES Occurrence Occurrence Occurrence Fatalities Fatalities Fatalities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(aid) -0.258*** -0.402*** -0.00748 -1.321*** -1.678*** -0.304**
(-0.0728) (-0.0986) (-0.0194) (-0.315) (-0.386) (-0.133)
Conflict 0.522*** 0.512*** 0.339** -0.0697 -0.0697 -0.000784
(-0.178) (-0.181) (-0.15) (-0.0658) (-0.0661) (-0.0031)
ln(lights) 0.187*** 0.225*** 0.152*** 0.557** 0.658** 0.123
(-0.0488) (-0.051) (-0.048) (-0.272) (-0.285) (-0.447)
ln(population) -2.447* -0.552 -0.561 -9.269*** -4.208* -2.908
(-1.33) (-1.313) (-1.102) (-2.73) (-2.544) (-2.321)
Aid Propensity Score 21.32*** 54.96***
(-4.709) (-15.55)
Observations 9,615 9,615 12,820 9,615 9,615 12,820
R-squared 0.132 0.106 0.13 -0.005 -0.022 0.008
Number of id 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205 3,205
p-value of F 0 0 0 0 0 0
CD Wald F 504.738 349.635 - 515.039 352.846 -
KP rk Wald F 259.025 162.123 - 266.83 164.68 -
Stock-Yogo 10% value 19.93 19.93 - 19.93 19.93 -
Hansen test 0.3103 0.2964 - 0.8853 0.4307 -
Main Results Explanations
I Aid helps to increase the government’s military power (or
potential) to preserve peaceful status, in which aid deters
conflict.
I Aid can help promote economic performance to reduce
conflict.
Robustness Tests
I Positive conflict occurrences or fatalities.
I Conflict < 95th percentile.
I Aid < 95th percentile.
I Lights > 0.
I Population > 0.
Further Exploration: Time Precision
I Can be: day, week, or month.
I If a conflict event has “week” precision:
I It actually lasted for weeks.
I We are confident it did not last for months, but the limited
information cannot tell it lasted for days.
I Aid seems to be particularly effective in reducing conflict
occurrences or fatalities if the events have better precision
(day or week).
Further Exploration: Conflict Types
I 9 types: Battle-No change of territory, Battle-Non-state actor
overtakes territory, Battle-Government regains territory,
Headquarters or base established, Strategic development,
Riots/Protests, Violence against civilians, Non-violent transfer
of territory, and Remote violence.
I Combine the first three into one type: Battle.
I Aid seems to be particularly effective in reducing conflict
occurrences or fatalities if the events have types of Battle,
Violence against civilians, and Remote violence.
Further Exploration: Non-Linearity of Income on Conflict
VARIABLES Occurrence Occurrence Fatalities Fatalities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(aid) -0.255*** -0.013 -1.256*** -0.307**
(-0.0728) (-0.02) (-0.32) (-0.137)
Conflict 0.520*** 0.339** -0.0694 -0.000783
(-0.178) (-0.149) (-0.0657) (-0.0031)
ln(lights/population) 15.84*** 8.475 34.63*** -6.986
(-5.53) (-5.187) (-12.02) (-12.21)
(ln(lights/population))2 -0.148** -0.128** -0.177 0.157
(-0.0684) (-0.0651) (-0.155) (-0.182)
Observations 9,612 12,816 9,612 12,816
R-squared 0.134 0.131 -0.002 0.008
Number of id 3,204 3,204 3,204 3,204
p-value of F 0 0 0 0
CD Wald F 545.703 - 549.147 -
KP rk Wald F 255.306 - 260.612 -
Stock-Yogo 10% value 19.93 - 19.93 -
Hansen test 0.3689 - 0.9156 -
Further Exploration: Non-Linearity of Income on Conflict
I Income on Conflict: Inverted U shaped curve. When income is
very low, increasing income marginally tends to cause more
fights for the limited resources, which hurts income. When
income is sufficiently high, increasing income tends to reduce
conflict.
I Sub-Saharan Africa is on the upward-sloping part.
I Aid can reduce conflict occurrences and fatalities, and
alleviate the poverty-conflict trap.
Conclusion
I Aid tends to reduce both conflict occurrences and fatalities in
the following period.
I Aid is particularly effective when conflict events with better
precision, or when certain types of conflict events are under
way.
I Aid can reduce conflict occurrences and fatalities, and
alleviate the poverty-conflict trap in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Future Work
I More exploration on the conflict types.
I Spillover effects.
I Aid at different levels.
I More robustness tests.
